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Abstract
Sociology has largely ignored class differences between American religious groups under the assumption that those dif-
ferences “are smaller than they used to be and are getting smaller all of the time” (Pyle & Davidson, 2014, p. 195). This
article demonstrates that profound class differences remain amongst American religious groups. These differences are as
large as—or larger than—commonly examined forms of inequality such as the gender pay gap and the race achievement
gap. Using the most popular categorization of American religious groups, we find that regardless of the particular measure
examined (years of education, income, socioeconomic index score, and proportion of members with at least a bachelor’s
degree) Jews and Mainline Protestants are at the top of the socioeconomic ladder and Evangelical Protestants, both black
andwhite, are at the bottom. Furthermore, religious group significantly predicts both years of education and the overall so-
cioeconomic standing of respondents by itself with basic controls. Likewise, both socioeconomic indicators and education
significantly predict the likelihood of being in a specific religious tradition on their own with basic controls. Some religious
groups, namely Evangelical Protestants at the low end and Jews and the high end, are relatively educationally homoge-
neous. Others, such as Catholics, Mainline Protestants and the nonreligious are much more educationally heterogeneous.
In sum, religious inequality remains in America, it is robust, and it appears to be quite durable.
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1. Introduction
Until very recently, religious inequality has not been a
commonly acknowledged nor researched phenomenon.
Indeed, especially in regression analyses, researchers
typically treat religion and class as independent factors.
This article demonstrates that profound class differences
remain between American religious groups that are both
substantively and statistically significant. These differ-
ences are as large or larger than commonly examined
forms of inequality, and appear to be just as durable
(Tilly, 1999). We therefore argue that researchers should
examine religion in interaction with class, rather than
controlling for it, in most analyses.
This article examines current differences in both ed-
ucation and socioeconomic indicators for the religious
categories typically used by survey researchers (RelTrad),
using two of the best datasets available: the General So-
cial Survey (GSS) and the Pew Religious Landscape Sur-
vey. We first demonstrate that, regardless of the mea-
sure or dataset, powerful class differences remain, with
Jews and Mainline Protestants at the top of the socioe-
conomic ladder and Evangelical Protestants, both black
and white, at the bottom.
These differences are as substantial as forms of in-
equality long acknowledged and studied by sociologists,
such as the gender pay gap or the race achievement
gap. For example, women today make approximately
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80 cents for every dollar that men make (Blau & Kahn,
2006, 2016; Graf, Brown, & Patten, 2017; Proctor, Se-
mega, & Kollar, 2016). In comparison, white Evangelical
Protestants make only 73 cents for every dollar made by
Mainline Protestants. In terms of education, white Evan-
gelical Protestants have half the proportion of bachelor’s
degrees as white Mainline Protestants and a quarter of
the BAs of white Jews. This is comparable to or larger
than many measures of racial inequality, including the
percentage of bachelor’s degree by race (Kao & Thomp-
son, 2003; Snyder & Dillow, 2015) and estimates of dif-
ferences in standardized test scores (Fryer & Levitt, 2004;
Hedges & Nowell, 1999; Kao & Thompson, 2003).
To be clear, we are not implying here that the mech-
anisms behind religious inequality are necessarily the
same as gender or racial inequality, which have long
been attributed to discrimination (aswell as other causes
such as gender socialization and the ways in which race
and class intersect). Our point here is merely that be-
cause these other forms of inequality are accepted as sig-
nificant, we knowmore about both their causes and their
consequences. In comparison, we know very little about
the causes or consequences of religious inequality today.
This is the case despite the fact that religious inequality
is robust, so much so that both education and socioe-
conomic indicators significantly predict religious group
membership, and religious group membership also sig-
nificantly predicts both measures of class.
In reporting these findings, we are not trying tomake
a causal argument. Instead,we simply aim to convince so-
ciologists that religion intersects with inequality in com-
plex ways and that those interactions should be exam-
ined in analyses. This argument, and the findings that
support it, are a result of our engagement with a growing
body of work that employs theories of “complex religion”
(Wilde, 2017; Wilde & Glassman, 2016; Wilde & Teving-
ton, 2017).
2. Complex Religion and the Current State of Research
on Religious Inequality
Theories of complex religion stress that religion is a
core social structure that deeply overlaps with inequal-
ity in crucial ways (Wilde, 2017;Wilde &Glassman, 2016;
Wilde & Tevington, 2017). This basic insight draws on
theories of “complex inequality” which argue that in-
equality is complex andmultidimensional (McCall, 2001).
Researchers in this school urge others to examine in-
equalities of gender, race, or class as a combination of
factors that interact with each other (Choo & Ferree,
2010). Stressing the “multiple, overlapping, conflicting,
and changing structures of inequality” (McCall, 2001, p.
14), these theorists argue that specific contexts of struc-
tural disadvantage lead to different outcomes and expe-
riences. Complex religion extends this argument to reli-
gion, urging researchers to consider religion a core social
structure that is highly correlated with inequality.
That religion intersects with inequality is neither a
new or revolutionary claim. Classical sociologists saw the
study of religion and class as core to the sociological
enterprise (Baltzell, 1964; Cantril, 1943; Greeley, 1978;
Niebhur, 1929; Pope, 1948; Weber, 2003). Some schol-
ars have examined socioeconomic differences between
religious traditions and denominations (Baltzell, 1964;
Cantril, 1943; Davidson & Pyle, 2011; Greeley, 1972;
Niebhur, 1929; Pope, 1948; Pyle, 2006; Pyle & David-
son, 2012, 2014; Schwadel, 2016; Sherkat, 2012; Smith
& Faris, 2005) while others have focused on stratification
within these traditions (Demerath, 1965; Eagle, 2012;
Reimer, 2007; Schwadel, 2009; Yancey & Kim, 2008). This
article examines both types of inequality.
Although once a common topic of classic sociologi-
cal studies, the connection between socioeconomic in-
equality and religious traditions has waned until very re-
cently (Keister & Sherkat, 2014). Perhaps because it went
largely uninvestigated for decades, most researchers
are under the impression that religious differences “are
smaller than they used to be and getting smaller all of the
time” (Pyle & Davidson, 2014, p. 195). However, a grow-
ing body of research suggests that, in oneway or another,
significant class differences remain between American
religious groups.
With a few exceptions (notably, Davidson & Pyle,
2011; Pyle & Davidson, 2014; Sherkat, 2012; Shi, Mas-
sengill, & Boddie, 2012; Smith & Faris, 2005), very lit-
tle contemporary scholarship intentionally examines the
full spectrum of religious inequality. In this article, our
goal is to establish that religious inequality remains in
America, and that it is, perhaps surprisingly, incredibly ro-
bust. As we focus on establishing the depth and strength
of religious inequality in America today, we are focusing
on class, although, of course, religion intersects with as-
pects of inequality other than class, especially race and
gender (Wilde&Danielsen, 2014).We leave claims about
how religion intersects with race or gender for future
analyses where they are the focus (although we do in-
clude both race and gender in this analysis).
2.1. What We Know about the State of Religious
Inequality
Although religious inequality has not been explicitly stud-
ied by many sociologists, it is possible to piece together
some clear patterns and predictions from previous stud-
ies. Originally the subject of much early sociological
thought (Weber, 2003), most accept that the differences
betweenCatholics andMainline Protestants havewaned,
but this is the case only if one does that not include re-
cent cohorts of Catholic immigrants in the comparison
(Keister, 2007).
By far the most well-documented (although, we
would argue, largely ignored in terms of its implications
both theoretically and methodologically) aspect of re-
ligious inequality today has to do with the lower class-
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standing of white Evangelical Protestants (Beyerlein,
2004; Darnell & Sherkat, 1997; Fitzgerald & Glass, 2008,
2014; Keister, 2008, 2012; Lehrer & Chen, 2014; Mas-
sengill, 2008; McConkey, 2001; Sherkat, 1991). Typically,
Evangelicals’—also known as Conservative Protestants—
lower class-standing is examined in comparison to Main-
line Protestants, the group that historically made up the
“Protestant Establishment” (Baltzell, 1964), sometimes
referred to as the “gatekeepers” of American society
(Coe & Davidson, 2014; Davidson & Pyle, 2011). Recent
research demonstrates that Mainline Protestants have
retained their class advantages and have been joined
by Jews at the top of religious economic ladder (Keister,
2003, 2012; Sherkat, 2012).
Racial discrimination has also shaped religious in-
equality in the U.S. Black Protestants, who are generally
seen to be theologically closest to Evangelicals (Greeley
& Hout, 2006), are largely even worse off than white
Evangelicals. Because having a separate Black Protes-
tant categorymakes interacting religious groupwith race
problematic and because fully 25% of African Ameri-
cans are not Black Protestants, we leave any claims
about intersections of racial inequality and religion to
other research (see Wilde, Pilgrim, & Shen, 2017)—
especially given recent developments about how to bet-
ter group African American religious groups (Shelton &
Cobb, 2017).
Finally, in terms of themajor religious groups covered
by RelTrad, we would be remiss to not discuss those with
no religion, often referred to as “Nones”. Nonreligious
Americans now constitute about 20% of the American
population (Hout & Fischer, 2014;Massengill, 2014). Our
analyses presented below demonstrate that Nones are
as varied in class background asMainline Protestants and
Catholics, a finding that—to the best of our knowledge—
has not been commonly observed in the literature.
2.2. Causes of Religious Inequality
Like other researchers interested in religion and inequal-
itywho explicitly eschew causal claims (Keister& Sherkat,
2014, p.3), we are not making any causal claims about
the differences we find here by employing the complex
religion approach. We do not argue that these differ-
ences result from people choosing their religious affili-
ation based on their social class, even though there is
some evidence of this (Hout & Wilde, 2004; Schwadel,
2011; Sherkat, 1991; Solt, 2014; Wuthnow, 1988). We
also do not argue that some religious subcultures encour-
age or discourage wealth accumulation (Keister, 2008,
2011) or class mobility, even though there is some evi-
dence of this (Darnell & Sherkat, 1997; Fitzgerald &Glass,
2008, 2014; Glass & Jacobs, 2005; Lehrer, 2004; Scheitle
& Smith, 2012; Sherkat, 2010, 2011).
While all of these are likelymechanisms behind some
of the differences between American religious groups,
the relatively large class differences we report here are
likely mostly a result of the process of social reproduc-
tion (Bourdieu, 1984; Pyle & Davidson, 2014) set in place
long ago by variations in immigration and settlement
patterns over the course of American history. These im-
migration patterns have interacted with race, ethnicity,
and variations in economic opportunity in different ge-
ographic areas in ways that disadvantage some group
groups while reproducing the advantage of others (Ellis,
2015; Orsi, 2002).
For example, at the turn of the twentieth century,
many elite Americans were deeply concerned with poor,
uneducated Catholic and Jewish immigrants’ flooding
the shores of the U.S. (Wilde & Danielsen, 2014). To-
day, white Catholics have assimilated into the U.S. and
achieved middle class white status (Greeley, 1978). Jews
have done even better, surpassing the educational at-
tainment of the most highly educated Mainline Protes-
tants. A key part of both groups’ mobility was access
to higher education (Keister, 2007), something that was
likely less accessible for religious groups that settled in
less urban areas outside of the Northeast, such as Evan-
gelical Protestants (Finke & Stark, 2005). New, more re-
cent waves of immigrant Catholics continue to change
the religious, ethnic, and class landscape. Latino immi-
grants, who constitute the majority of those of “other”
ethnicities in the Catholic category (Pew Research Cen-
ter, 2015) are much less educated and have less wealth
(Keister & Borelli, 2014).
Not all recent immigrants have low levels of educa-
tion, however. Because of changes to immigration laws,
recent immigrants from other areas of the world (who
are mostly of non-Christian faiths) are among the most
educated of Americans today (Amin & Sherkat, 2014;
Cadge & Ecklund, 2007; Read & Eagle, 2014). For exam-
ple, 85% of American Hindus have at least a bachelor’s
degree or more—more than double the percentage of
Mainline Protestants and four times that of Evangelicals
(see Table 2).
Our main point in this part is that, regardless of the
initial causes and subsequent mechanisms associated
with it, religious inequality remains. It is large, and if clas-
sical sociologists were right in their assessments more
than a century ago, it is durable.
3. Data and Methods
For our analysis, we use both the GSS and the Pew 2014
Religious Landscape Survey. The GSS, conducted regu-
larly since 1972, is a full probability interview study that
measures both attitudinal and social characteristics of
the U.S. (NORC at the University of Chicago, 2016). With
a sample of approximately 1500 respondents per year,
it is necessary to pool many years of the GSS together
to get a large enough sample for advanced statistical
analysis. Although we do this and control for year in
an attempt to capture changes in the sample over time
(1990–2016), we also replicate all of our analyses with a
larger and more contemporary dataset to capture pop-
ulation changes that might not be adequately examined
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by just controlling for year—the Pew2014Religious Land-
scape Survey.
The 2014 Religious Landscape Survey is a telephone
survey of more than 35,0000 respondents across the
U.S., which probes on issues of religious identification,
social and political attitudes, and demographicmeasures
(Pew Research Center, 2015). We only present the tables
from the GSS in the text but discuss differences between
the GSS and Pew data when relevant. The Pew tables are
available in the Annex at the end of this article.
We use the religious classification scheme, RelTrad
(Steensland et al., 2000) which has beenmost commonly
used by researchers, with nearly 900 publications utiliz-
ing this categorization (Stetzer & Burge, 2016). On the
basis of denominational affiliation, RelTrad sorts individ-
uals into one of seven major religious traditions: Jew-
ish, Mainline Protestant, Other religion, Nonaffiliated,
Catholic, Evangelical Protestant, and Black Protestant.
While this study is focused on class differences, as we
stated above, we do not restrict it to whites, and there-
fore include controls for gender and race in our mod-
els. We also include controls for: year, urban residence,
Southern residence, and religious service attendance.
Year is measured by the GSS variable “year”. Gen-
der is captured by a dummy variable (using GSS vari-
able “sex”), where female is defined as 1 and male is
defined as 0. Urban residence was measured using the
GSS variable “res16”, which asks respondents what type
of place they were living at age 16. We recoded this
as a dummy variable, where “1” included categories of
“50,0000–250,000”, “big city-suburb”, and “city greater
than 250,000” and 0 included the categories “county,
nonfarm”, “farm”, and “town less than 50,0000”. South-
ern residence is measured using GSS variable (“reg16”),
which asks respondents where they were living at age 16.
We define it as a dummy variable, where Southern resi-
dence is “1” and includes residence in the categories of
“South Atlantic”, “East South Central”, and “West South
Central” and “0” for all other areas. Finally, religious ser-
vice attendance is captured by the GSS variable “attend’,
which asks respondents how often they attend religious
services. We recoded this as a dummy variable, where
“1” captured high attenders (once a month or more) and
“0” captured low attenders (several times a year or less).
We use four different measures of class in this study.
Our first, and simplest measure is of the total number
of years of education respondents report (GSS variable
“educ”). Our second measure, “percent BA”, is an aggre-
gate score thatwe created of the percentage ofmembers
in each religious group with at least a bachelor’s degree.
Our third measure is the mean household income per
capita of members in each religious group (in constant
2,000 U.S. dollars). Our fourth measure (GSS measure
“sei10”, which wewill simply refer to as “SEI” henceforth)
is a composite score that incorporates education, income
and occupational prestige, thus providing an avenue to
examine status as part of social class standing (Campbell
& Parker, 1983; Duncan, 1961; Haug, 1977; Hout, Smith,
&Marsden, 2016). Descriptive statistics for all of the vari-
ableswe use in ourmodels can be found below in Table 1.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables.
Mean Proportion SD Min Max Observations
Religious Tradition 35499
Evangelical 0.258 9164
Mainline 0.168 5970
Black Protestant 0.085 3003
Catholic 0.253 8987
Jewish 0.020 708
Other Faith 0.061 2159
No Religion 0.155 5508
Education 13.364 3.032 0 20 37476
SEI 45.836 22.462 9 99.9 36007
Race 37573
White 0.781 29329
Black 0.142 5351
Other 0.077 2893
Attendance 3.631 2.753 0 8 37108
Age 46.770 17.338 18 89 37463
Year 2002.973 7.722 1990 2016 37573
Female 0.558 0.497 0 1 37573
South 0.311 0.463 0 1 37573
Urban 0.449 0.497 0 1 35999
Note: Data from GSS 1990–2016.
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3.1. Methods
The analysis that follows seeks to map the amount and
contours of religious inequality today. We begin by ex-
amining basic cross-tabulations of a variety of measures
of inequality (including income, mean year of school-
ing, proportion of members with at least a bachelor’s
degree, as well as examining each group’s SEI to get
a picture of the overall amount of inequality between
groups). We then move to regression, first using Or-
dinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analyses to pre-
dict individual’s years of education and SEI via religious
group membership.	
After finding that religion is a robust predictor of
Americans’ class backgrounds, we then turn to using ed-
ucation and socioeconomic background to predict reli-
gious affiliation. Because religion is a nominal variable
with more than two categories, we use Multinomial
Logistic Regression in our next models, with Mainline
Protestants as our reference category. After demonstrat-
ing that the relationship between class and religion is
robust via these series of regression analyses as well,
we then close by examining the amount of heterogene-
ity within each group. We do so by examining Gini-
coefficients for the educational attainment and socioe-
conomic status of each of our religious groups.
4. Findings
Our first, most basic, but at the same time perhaps
most important findings, are presented on Table 2, which
presents data from the GSS.
Table 2. Variations in class by religious denominations, GSS 1990–2016 (ages 25–65).1
N Mean Income (a) Mean SEI (b) Mean Year of % BA or More (d)
Schooling (c)
Jewish 482 42.68 61.38 16.10 68.46
Conservative Jewish 107 42.49 61.59 16.36 74.77
Reform Jewish 216 48.77 62.58 16.21 72.22
Other Jewish 98 39.89 57.41 15.77 60.20
Orthodox Jewish 38 22.40 59.56 15.55 57.89
Mainline Protestant 4,024 29.12 51.07 14.33 38.52
Quaker 29 33.48 59.56 15.10 55.17
Presbyterian-merged 104 30.26 56.84 14.95 53.85
Episcopal 500 35.91 56.87 15.36 52.00
Congregationalist (e) 98 27.08 56.97 14.70 50.00
Disciples of Christ 42 24.09 54.39 14.67 47.62
PCUSA (f) 372 30.55 53.17 14.68 45.97
United Church of Christ 59 33.47 54.03 14.51 42.37
Presbyterian-don’t know which 239 30.48 50.43 14.07 36.82
United Methodist* 1,396 28.38 50.53 14.26 37.46
ECLA (g) 537 26.89 49.38 14.20 34.08
Methodist-don’t know which* 222 24.48 46.21 13.42 24.77
American Baptist in the U.S. 69 21.80 38.34 12.94 17.39
Other Religion 1,693 23.75 49.80 14.33 37.86
Hindu 76 30.89 70.30 16.55 85.53
Unitarian Universalist 84 38.43 61.91 16.26 69.05
Buddhist 135 32.36 56.72 15.19 58.52
Orthodox Christian 80 25.12 51.10 15.00 52.50
Other Eastern 31 31.68 59.34 14.67 45.16
Muslim 117 17.94 48.84 14.18 38.46
Other Faith 550 23.86 49.27 14.43 36.36
Mormon 312 19.49 47.36 14.14 28.53
Jehovah’s Witness 209 15.43 36.67 11.79 5.26
No Religion 4,243 26.26 48.14 14.00 33.44
Catholic 6,668 24.78 46.43 13.48 28.99
White Catholics 5,335 26.93 48.35 13.81 31.60
Other Catholics 1,037 15.54 37.96 11.86 17.65
1 This table provides detailed information about all denominations with at least 25 respondents within the GSS pooled data (1990–2016).
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Table 2. Variations in class by religious denominations, GSS 1990–2016 (ages 25–65). (Cont.)
N Mean Income (a) Mean SEI (b) Mean Year of % BA or More (d)
Schooling (c)
Evangelical Protestant 6,828 21.36 44.28 13.17 21.32
Other Presbyterian 90 28.80 52.65 14.81 46.67
Lutheran-MO Synod 339 26.56 50.29 14.17 32.74
Nondenominational (h) 1,118 23.74 48.29 14.04 32.65
Christian Reform 44 21.50 45.70 13.91 31.82
Other Lutheran 79 26.62 47.74 13.61 30.38
Independent 30 20.48 49.19 13.97 30.00
Evangelist (i) 74 16.12 45.34 12.77 28.38
Brethren (j) 26 19.65 46.17 12.69 26.92
Christian, Central Christian 207 20.00 46.68 13.36 26.09
Other Methodist* 47 24.80 47.78 13.72 25.53
Lutheran-don’t know which 292 27.73 45.87 13.52 25.00
Church of Christ 265 22.85 44.85 13.35 21.51
7th Day Adventist 99 18.47 43.36 13.08 20.20
Lutheran-WI synod 91 22.73 45.83 13.44 19.78
Nazarene 76 24.16 42.74 13.41 19.74
Other Baptist* 307 20.61 45.17 13.20 19.22
Southern Baptist* 1,655 22.02 44.27 13.06 19.15
Assembly of God 149 19.33 45.13 12.87 16.78
American Baptist Association* 191 22.62 40.09 12.68 15.71
Other Fundamentalist 26 20.12 40.73 12.15 15.38
Churches of God (k) 103 15.48 40.36 12.17 13.59
Freewill Baptist 63 15.34 39.96 12.67 11.11
Baptist- Don’t know which* 936 18.86 38.77 12.29 10.68
Pentecostal 520 15.40 38.79 12.20 9.42
Pentecostal Holiness (l) 33 12.43 39.59 12.12 9.09
Black Protestant 2,310 16.53 37.81 12.82 14.29
African Methodist Episcopal Zion 47 16.65 42.82 13.49 27.66
National Baptist Convention in America 103 23.05 40.12 13.58 22.33
National Baptist Convention in the USA 60 20.84 42.88 13.52 21.67
African Methodist Episcopal 105 18.01 41.44 13.22 20.00
Southern Baptist+ 512 17.71 39.24 13.01 16.21
Other Baptist+ 94 17.34 38.28 12.51 15.96
Baptist- Don’t know which+ 863 15.68 37.32 12.80 13.33
Apostolic Faith 25 21.48 40.03 12.24 12.00
American Baptist Association+ 174 13.64 35.79 12.47 11.49
American Baptists in the U.S.+ 118 14.05 33.25 12.31 8.47
Church of God in Christ 25 11.51 33.94 12.88 8.00
Missionary Baptist+ 31 16.38 35.93 12.48 3.23
Methodist- Don’t know which+ 39 15.27 33.24 12.56 2.56
Holiness (m) 62 11.62 28.85 11.28 1.61
Notes: (a) Household income per capita in 1,000 dollars, adjusted to 2,000 constant dollars; (b) GSS variable “sei10”; (c) GSS variable
“Educ”; (d) using GSS variable “Degree”, values are combined for respondents with a bachelor’s degree or a graduate degree; (e) GSS
category “Congregationalist, 1st Congregationalist”; (f) PCUSA includes “Presbyterian Church in U.S”. and “United Presbyterian Church
in U.S” categories; (g) ECLA includes “Lutheran Church in America”, “American Lutheran”, and “Evangelical Lutheran” categories; (h) in-
cluded only if respondents attended church more than once a month (ATTEND < 4); (i) GSS category “Evangelical; Evangelist”; (j) GSS
category “Brethren Church; Brethren”; (k) GSS category “Churches of God (except with Christ and Holiness)”; (l) GSS category “Pente-
costal Holiness; Holiness Pentecostal”; (m) GSS category “Holiness; Church of Holiness”; *Included only if race is not black; +Included
only if race is black.
Through simple cross-tabulations of individuals by re-
ligious tradition, Table 2 demonstrates that profound so-
cioeconomic differences remain between American reli-
gious groups.
Whether we examine mean year of schooling, mean
income, the percent with BAs, or mean SEI score, the pic-
ture remains the same with small variations.
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By far the most important differences exist between
the two categories of white Protestants on Table 2. Main-
line Protestants have almost twice the percentage of peo-
ple with BAs as Evangelical Protestants. The other mea-
sures tell the same story. With a mean SEI of 51 and an
average household income that is nearly one-third larger
than Evangelicals, Mainline Protestants are doing very
well economically.
Also doing well are those of other religions and no
religion, with SEI scores almost equivalent to Mainline
Protestants, although those of other faiths have incomes
that are much lower—approaching that of Evangelicals.
Catholics are generally doing better than Evangelicals,
but not as well as the other groups in our analysis.
Figure 1 illustrates this overall pattern by the percent-
age of each group that has a bachelor’s degree or more.
This simple picture clearly illustrates the major educa-
tional differences that remain among American religious
groups. Jews remain the most highly educated group by
far, while Black Protestants have the lowest proportion
of members with bachelor’s degrees or more.
In addition, Figure 1 also demonstrates that mem-
bers of “Other religions” such as Hindus, Buddhists, and
Muslims, are generally quite highly educated. This is
most likely a result of more recent immigration and
an artifact of American immigration laws, which select
the highly educated from many areas of the world.
Figure 1 also demonstrates the relatively highly edu-
cated nature of those who profess no religion, an ever-
growing proportion of the population (Hout & Fischer,
2002, 2014; Sherkat, 2014). The percentage of Nones
who have a bachelor’s degree is almost equal to that
of Mainline Protestants. Finally, Figure 1 also demon-
strates that Catholics remain less educated than Main-
line Protestants,2 something expected because of recent
Latino immigration, but are more educated that white
Evangelical Protestants.
4.1. Predicting Class by Religion
Cross-tabulations, although useful, do not allow us to ex-
amine more complex relationships. Thus, we turn to Ta-
ble 3, which uses religion to predict years of education
and SEI via Ordinary Least Squares regression techniques
with standard controls. Table 3 demonstrates that the
class and educational differences between religious tra-
ditions are both substantively and statistically significant.
When compared to Mainline Protestants, every group
except Jews and those of other religions is significantly
worse off.
First, Model 1 demonstrates the significant educa-
tional disadvantage thatwhite Evangelical Protestants ex-
perience relative to white Mainline Protestants (our ref-
erence category)—with 1.2 fewer years of education pre-
dicted. White Evangelical Protestants are the only white
group that is predicted to havebarelymore thanone year
of education post high school. Model 2 demonstrates
that the picture is largely the same for SEI. Predicted
probabilities of both models are presented pictorially in
Figures 2 and 3.
The predicted probabilities demonstrate that similar
proportions ofMainline Protestants, those of no religion,
and those from other religious have about two years of
higher education. Evangelicals and Catholics peak a full
year earlier.
Figure 3, which presents the predicted percentage
of members of each religious group with various SEI
scores, presents the most complete picture of economic
advantage and disadvantage, with the overall class ad-
vantage of Mainline Protestants coming into view more
clearly. Second only to Jews in SEI, almost 70% of Main-
line Protestants have a predicted SEI between 45-50. In
comparison, nearly three-quarters of Evangelicals have a
predicted SEI of 40 or below.
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Figure 1. Variations in education by religious group, GSS 1990–2016.
2 This gap has lessened in the Pew data, which is to be expected as it is more contemporary data.
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Table 3. Effects of religion on years of education and SEI, GSS 1990–2016.
Model 1 Model 2
Education SEI
Mainline Protestant Reference Reference
Evangelical −1.306*** −6.884***
(.050) (.387)
Black Protestant −.937*** −6.661***
(.088) (.690)
Catholic −1.043*** −5.275***
(.050) (.388)
Jewish 1.332*** 8.296***
(.118) (.909)
Other Religion −.171* −1.055
(.075) (.582)
No Religion −.205*** −.708
(.060) (.462)
White Reference Reference
Black −1.015*** −7.847***
(.065) (.507)
Other Race −1.128*** −4.306***
(.061) (.481)
Attendance .150*** .892***
(.006) (.050)
Age −.026*** .056***
(.001) (.007)
Year .035*** .117***
(.002) (.016)
Female −.154*** −3.272***
(.032) (.246)
South −.421*** −1.365***
(.036) (.282)
Urban .823*** 4.978***
(.033) (.251)
R2 (%) 10.98 6.77
N 33544 32201
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001.
4.2. Predicting Religion by Class
As we noted earlier, the point of this article is not to
make a causal argument but rather to demonstrate the
interrelated nature of class and religion in the U.S. Thus,
our next set of analyses switches our dependent and in-
dependent variables and use SEI and education to pre-
dict religious groupmembership usingMultinomial Logis-
tic Regression. These analyses are presented on Tables 4
and 5 and illustrated by Figures 4 and 5.
Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate that the probability of
being in a particular religious group changes significantly
as our indicators of class background rise, whether we
use a simple measure of education or the more complex
measure of SEI. Of course, these predictions are depen-
dent to some extent on the relative proportion of each
group in theGSS (see Table 1 for the relative proportions).
However, the point here is that these religious groups are
not evenly distributed across socioeconomic groups.
Individuals with low SEIs (less than a high school ed-
ucation and low occupational prestige and income) are
twice as likely to be Evangelical Protestant as Mainline
Protestant and four times as likely to be Evangelical than
to be Jewish or some other religion. At the other end of
the class spectrum, individualswith a high SEI (more than
a college degree and a high occupational prestige and
income) are 50% more likely to be Mainline Protestant
than Evangelical Protestant or Catholic.
4.3. Educational Homogeneity
Finally, just as there ismore socioeconomic inequality be-
tween some groups than others, some groups are more
heterogeneous class-wise than others.
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Figure 2. Predicted percentage of members with education level by religious tradition, GSS 1990–2016.
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Figure 3. Predicted percentage of members’ SEI score by religious tradition, GSS 1990-2016.
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Table 4. The likelihood of religious group membership by education.
Evangelical Black Protestant Catholic Jewish Other Religion No Religion
Education 0.847*** 0.874*** 0.876*** 1.192*** 0.975*** 1.003
(0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.018) (0.009) (0.008)
White Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Black 1.054 397.759*** 0.842** 0.492** 2.873*** 3.642***
(0.085) (48.591) (0.074) (0.138) (0.285) (0.336)
Other Race 1.802*** 6.913*** 5.238*** 0.513* 9.120*** 3.085***
(0.203) (1.941) (0.542) (0.181) (1.041) (0.357)
Attendance 1.205*** 1.024* 1.073*** 0.846*** 1.046*** 0.506***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007)
Age 0.977*** 0.987*** 0.977*** 1.002 0.971*** 0.957***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Year 1.029*** 1.002 1.028*** 1.004 1.024*** 1.068***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Female 0.885*** 1.043 0.863*** 0.953 0.863*** 0.646***
(0.032) (0.070) (0.031) (0.080) (0.046) (0.028)
South 1.970*** 2.054*** 0.416*** 0.524*** 0.528*** 0.701***
(0.075) (0.144) (0.018) (0.060) (0.035) (0.036)
Urban 0.972 1.152** 1.776*** 6.858*** 1.606*** 1.541***
(0.037) (0.081) (0.066) (0.722) (0.087) (0.069)
Notes: Number of observations is 33544. Pseudo R-squared is .2433. Standard errors in parentheses. * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001.
Table 5. The likelihood of religious group membership by SEI.
Evangelical Black Protestant Catholic Jewish Other Religion No Religion
SEI 0.985*** 0.986*** 0.989*** 1.017*** 0.998* 1.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
White Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Black 1.123 416.589*** 0.867 0.502** 2.874*** 3.748***
(0.093) (52.366) (0.078) (0.141) (0.295) (0.357)
Other Race 2.071*** 7.150*** 5.693*** 0.452** 9.214*** 3.182***
(0.239) (2.117) (0.607) (0.178) (1.088) (0.380)
Attendance 1.194*** 1.015 1.065*** 0.852*** 1.040*** 0.507***
(0.008) (0.015) (0.007) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007)
Age 0.982*** 0.990*** 0.981*** 0.999 0.973*** 0.958***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Year 1.025*** 0.998 1.024*** 1.007 1.022*** 1.068***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Female 0.854*** 1.034 0.841*** 0.944 0.859*** 0.646***
(0.031) (0.071) (0.031) (0.081) (0.047) (0.029)
South 2.094*** 2.178*** 0.433*** 0.493*** 0.544*** 0.699***
(0.080) (0.157) (0.019) (0.058) (0.037) (0.036)
Urban 0.920** 1.142* 1.703*** 7.425*** 1.618*** 1.539***
(0.035) (0.082) (0.063) (0.801) (0.089) (0.070)
Notes: Number of observations is 32201. Pseudo R-squared is .2367. Standard errors in parentheses. * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001.
Table 6 presents Gini-coefficients for the educational
attainment and socioeconomic status of each of our reli-
gious groups. AGini-coefficient is ameasure of inequality
in the distribution of a variable. Its value ranges from 0
to 1, where 0 is perfect equality and 1 is perfect inequal-
ity (Beckfield, 2006; Firebaugh, 1999). Both Ginis provide
interesting, and somewhat different, perspectives on re-
ligious inequality.
The education Gini, which Figure 6 helps to visualize,
demonstrates that Jews and Evangelical Protestants are
quite distinct educationally, both being more homoge-
neous than the other groups. The median is represented
by the horizontal line cutting through the center of most
of the boxes, with the exception of the Evangelical box
(for which the median overlaps with the bottom quar-
tile). The dots represent the presence of outliers, or re-
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Table 6. Education and SEI Gini-coefficients.
Education SEI
Evangelical 0.116 0.274
Mainline 0.110 0.257
Black Protestant 0.114 0.297
Catholic 0.125 0.281
Jewish 0.097 0.203
Other Faith 0.121 0.275
No Religion 0.116 0.280
Notes: Data from GSS 1990–2016. Weights are used.
spondents who are more than 1.5 times the interquar-
tile range in either direction. The first quartile for Jews is
higher than themedians for the other religious traditions,
which demonstrates that most Jews are highly educated.
Among Evangelical Protestants, the first quartile and me-
dian are the same (12 years). This means at least 25% of
Evangelical Protestants in our sample have 12 years of
education, which makes the distribution of years of edu-
cation for Evangelical Protestants quite dense.
Catholics, Mainline Protestants and the nonreligious
are muchmore educationally heterogeneous, but less so
than people of other faiths who are the most widely dis-
persed educationally. This is the case even though those
of other faiths have the second highest years of edu-
cation on average, suggesting a fairly educationally di-
verse group.
The picture is the same when socioeconomic hetero-
geneity is examined in Figure 7, except that Mainline
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Protestants emerge as more clearly advantaged socioe-
conomically with the second highest SEI and a moderate
standard deviation, which means most Mainline Protes-
tants are also high SEI. People of other faiths, on average,
have the third highest SEI, yet they are the most widely
dispersed socioeconomically, again suggesting a wide di-
versity of socioeconomic backgrounds among this group.
5. Conclusion
Religious inequality remains strong in the U.S. Originally,
the “gatekeepers” of American society (Davidson & Pyle,
2011), Mainline Protestants remain at the top of the
socioeconomic ladder, with almost 40% of them hav-
ing a bachelor’s degree or more on average (see Ta-
ble 2). Even so, the legacy of the different histories and
settlement patterns of Mainline Protestant denomina-
tions can still be seen. For example, more than 50%
of members from groups that would have been con-
sidered part of the Protestant establishment (Baltzell,
1964)—Congregationalist, Episcopalians, Presbyterians,
and Quakers—have a bachelor’s degree or more. How-
ever, some groups in the Mainline Protestant category
as operationalized by RelTrad, groups that were arguably
not a part of Mainline Protestantism historically, such
as the American Baptists in the U.S., have lower per-
centages of highly educated members. As a result, the
educational Gini on Table 6 and Figure 6 demonstrate
that Mainline Protestants as operationalized by Rel-
Trad are one of the most educationally heterogeneous
groups today.
Despite the fact that the Mainline Protestant cate-
gory is quite heterogenous, however, there are two ad-
ditional important points to note. Socioeconomically, it
appearsMainline Protestants are doing better thanmore
recent immigrants who have been selected for their ed-
ucational credentials, such as those from other religions.
Secondly, they remain educationally and socioeconomi-
cally quite distinct from Evangelicals. Evangelical Protes-
tants have only half the proportion of members with
bachelor’s degrees as Mainline Protestants. Evangelical
Protestants’ lower educational attainment is also a re-
sult of greater educational homogeneity, as illustrated by
Figure 6.
Jews have surpassed even the most educated Main-
line Protestants, with 68% of Jews having a bachelor’s
degree or more (see Table 2), a proportion that is sur-
passed only by the 85% American Hindus with a college
degree or more. However, one should not fail to forget
that groups such as Unitarian Universalist, who are to-
day not included within Mainline Protestantism because
of their “unorthodox” beliefs, were part of the Protes-
tant Establishment. Today, 69% of Unitarian Universal-
ists have a bachelor’s degree or more—more than Jews
on average.
Those of no religion are also fairly well educated, hav-
ing 1.5 times the proportion of college degrees as Evan-
gelical Protestants.
The analyses presented in this article also demon-
strate that Catholics have indeed entered the middle
class (see Table 2), with almost 30% of them having bach-
elor’s degrees or more overall. However, this is not the
case for all Catholics, as Latino Catholics remain at an
educational disadvantage relative to the descendants of
earlier Roman Catholic immigrants. This ethnic and his-
torical diversity makes American Catholics one of the
most heterogeneous religious groups in the U.S. today—
with a lower median but similar distribution to Mainline
Protestants, Nones, and those of other religions.
Finally, Black Protestants remain at the greatest edu-
cational and economic disadvantage of all American re-
ligious groups, having less than half the proportion of
bachelor’s degrees as Catholics or those of no religion.
Given the significant differences in the class back-
grounds of American religious groups that we have pre-
sented here, we argue that researchers should not treat
measures of class such as socioeconomic background
and education as if they are independent from religion
in statistical analyses. Instead we recommend that re-
searchers examine religion in interaction with measures
of class in analyses whenever possible. Doing so will al-
low religion’s intersections with other social structures
to show through in all its complexity.
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Annex
The Pew data confirms the findings laid out in our paper. Table A1 shows the descriptive statistics for our variables using
the Pew 2014 Religious Landscape data. Please note that SEI is not available in the Pew data and is thus not included.
Table A1. Descriptives of variables, Pew data.
Mean / Proportion SD Min Max Observations
Religious tradition (a) 34848
Evangelical 0.255 8896
Mainline 0.148 5144
Black Protestant 0.065 2271
Catholic 0.201 7304
Jewish 0.019 650
Other Faith 0.074 2579
Nonaffiliated 0.230 8005
Education 13.543 2.373 8 18 34868
Race 34549
White 0.662 22862
Black 0.116 4002
Other 0.223 7686
Attendance 3.561 1.635 1 6 34854
Age Range 5.972 3.555 1 15 34345
Female 0.515 0.500 0 1 35071
South 0.371 0.483 0 1 35071
Urban 0.373 0.484 0 1 35071
Notes: Data from Pew 2014 Religious Landscape Study. All descriptives use the weight provided by Pew in their dataset. Age range
starts from age 24 or below with 1 increase as an increment of 5 years. For simplicity, the observations for each category of RelTrad
and race are rounded to integers; (a) The Pew Religious Landscape data is grouped into religious traditions with the same logic as
Steensland et al. (2000), with a few exceptions. Notably, the Pew data breaks out some large religious groups to stand on their own in
their classification scheme. In order to maintain consistency across the data, we recoded the Pew RelTrad variable as follows: Mormons,
Orthodox Christians, Jehovah’s Witness, Other Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and Other World Religions were coded as “Other
Faith”. The category of “don’t know/refused” was dropped from the analysis.
Table A2 presents comparable crosstabulations for the religious traditions and mean income and proportion of members
with bachelor’s degrees using the 2014 Pew Religious Landscape data. The overall picture is the same: Jews and Mainline
Protestants have a larger proportion of members with bachelor’s degrees and higher mean income compared to Evan-
gelicals and Black Protestants. One notable difference in the Pew data is that those of “Other Religions” have a higher
proportion of members with bachelor’s degrees than Mainline Protestants, which is reversed in the GSS data.
Table A2. Variations in class and demography by religious denominations, Pew data (ages 25–64).
N* Mean Income Percent with BA or more
Jewish 361 120.77 68.38
Mainline Protestant 2940 78.41 36.60
Other Religion 1647 69.22 43.95
No Religion 5032 66.75 34.06
Catholic 4535 66.75 30.14
Evangelical Protestant 5594 61.68 24.03
Black Protestant 1493 41.07 16.57
Note: * These counts were generated using the provided weight and were rounded to the nearest integer.
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Table A3 uses religion to predict years of education via Ordinary Least Squares regression techniqueswith standard controls
using the Pew Religious Landscape data. Compared to Mainline Protestants, Evangelicals, Black Protestants, and Catholics
are less educated. As was the case in the GSS data set, Jews are significantly more educated than Mainline Protestants.
There is no statistically significant difference found betweenMainline Protestants and those of no religion or other religions
using the Pew data.
Table A3. Effects of religion on years of education, Pew dataset.
Education
Mainline Protestant Reference
Evangelical −0.798***
(0.042)
Black Protestant −0.775***
(0.085)
Catholic −0.529***
(0.043)
Jewish 1.025***
(0.090)
Other Religion 0.330***
(0.058)
Nonaffiliated 0.070
(0.046)
White Reference
Black −0.753***
(.062)
Other Race −1.100***
(.036)
Attendance 0.121***
(0.010)
Age 0.000
(.004)
Female −0.175***
(.026)
South 0.029
(.028)
Urban 0.605***
(0.028)
R2 (%) 7.77
N 33531
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001.
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Finally, Table A4 demonstrates that religious groups are not evenly distributed across educational groups, using the Pew
data set. Again, these predictions are dependent to some extent on the relative proportion of each group in the Pew
Religious Landscape data (see Table A1 for the relative proportions). However, the point here is that these religious groups
are not evenly distributed across socioeconomic groups. The overall picture displayed here is very similar to that found
using the GSS dataset, with some gains and losses of statistical significance.
Table A4. The likelihood of religious group membership by education, Pew data.
Evangelical Black Protestant Catholic Jewish Other Religion Nonaffiliated
Education 0.868*** 0.850*** 0.914*** 1.222*** 1.056*** 1.032***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (0.022) (0.011) (0.009)
White Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Black 1.758*** 1,143.118*** 1.138 0.415*** 3.486*** 4.674***
(0.172) (203.604) (0.129) (0.138) (0.404) (0.493)
Other Race 1.552*** 14.026*** 3.803*** 0.621*** 3.697*** 2.112***
(0.092) (2.829) (0.214) (0.102) (0.252) (0.132)
Attendance 1.463*** 1.180*** 1.102*** 0.788*** 1.061*** 0.373***
(0.018) (0.033) (0.014) (0.021) (0.018) (0.006)
Age 0.941*** 0.988 0.982*** 0.994 0.891*** 0.839***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005)
Year 0.882*** 0.989 0.897*** 0.886 0.801*** 0.697***
(0.032) (0.074) (0.033) (0.068) (0.039) (0.028)
Female 1.426*** 1.275*** 0.608*** 0.727*** 0.600*** 0.751***
(0.052) (0.099) (0.024) (0.062) (0.032) (0.032)
South 0.864*** 0.865* 1.744*** 5.304*** 1.177*** 1.188***
(0.035) (0.068) (0.069) (0.441) (0.062) (0.051)
Notes: Number of observations is 33531; pseudo R-squared is .2226; the reference category of religion is Mainline Protestant; standard
errors in parentheses; * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001.
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